MalChela Meets AI: Three Paths to Smarter Malware Analysis

In a previous post I wrote about integrating MalChela with OpenCode on REMnux and giving the AI a quick briefing on the tool suite so it could incorporate them into its analysis workflow. That was a promising proof of concept, but it raised a natural follow-up question: how do you make these integrations more robust, reproducible, and persistent?

Since that post, I’ve been experimenting with three different approaches to bringing MalChela into AI-assisted workflows — each suited to a different environment and use case. This post walks through all three.


Approach 1: The Kali MCP Server (Toby)

The first implementation started with Toby — my portable Raspberry Pi forensics toolkit running a customized Kali Linux build. Toby is designed for headless operation via SSH, which turns out to be exactly the right architecture for an MCP server. The developers of Kali recently added an update to support MCP integrations. (See https://www.kali.org/blog/kali-llm-claude-desktop/)

Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open standard that allows AI assistants like Claude to interface with external tools and systems in a structured, reliable way. Instead of pasting instructions into a chat window each session, you define your tools once in a server configuration and the AI has consistent, persistent access to them.

The setup leverages an existing open-source mcp-kali-server that exposes Kali’s forensic and security tooling as MCP tools. On the client side (Mac), the claude_desktop_config.json simply points to Toby (or your Kali box) over SSH:

{
"mcpServers": {
"mcp-kali-server": {
"command": "ssh",
"args": [
"-i",
"/Users/dwmetz/.ssh/id_ed25519",
"dwmetz@192.168.10.89",
"mcp-server"
],
"transport": "stdio"
}
}
}

With this in place, Claude Desktop has persistent, session-independent access to Kali’s toolkit running on Toby. No need to re-brief the AI each session — the tools are always available and always described the same way.

Key prerequisite: passwordless SSH key-based auth between your Mac and Toby. If you haven’t set that up:

ssh-keygen -t ed25519
ssh-copy-id user@<toby/kali-ip>
# Then one manual SSH to accept the host key fingerprint
ssh user@<toby/kali-ip>

Adding MalChela to the Kali MCP Server

The mcp-kali-server ships with routes for Kali’s built-in security tools, but MalChela isn’t included out of the box. Adding it requires changes to two files: kali_server.py (the Flask API backend) and mcp_server.py (the FastMCP frontend). Both live at /usr/share/mcp-kali-server/.

How the architecture works: mcp_server.py is what Claude talks to — it defines MCP tool names, descriptions, and parameter schemas. When a tool is called, it POSTs to kali_server.py, which constructs the actual shell command and executes it on Toby. The critical detail is that MalChela’s binaries must be run from within the MalChela workspace directory — running them from an arbitrary working directory causes failures. The cd {MALCHELA_DIR} && prefix in every command handles this.

kali_server.py changes

Add the MALCHELA_DIR constant (update with your MalChela install path) and Flask routes after the existing tool routes, before the health check endpoint:

# ============================================================
# MalChela Tool Routes
# Adjust MALCHELA_DIR if MalChela is installed elsewhere
# ============================================================
MALCHELA_DIR = "/home/dwmetz/tools/MalChela"
@app.route("/api/tools/malchela/fileanalyzer", methods=["POST"])
def malchela_fileanalyzer():
"""MalChela: Hash, entropy, packing detection, PE headers, YARA scan, VirusTotal lookup."""
try:
params = request.json
filepath = params.get("filepath", "")
if not filepath:
return jsonify({"error": "filepath parameter is required"}), 400
command = f"cd {MALCHELA_DIR} && ./target/release/fileanalyzer \"{filepath}\""
result = execute_command(command)
return jsonify(result)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error in malchela_fileanalyzer endpoint: {str(e)}")
return jsonify({"error": f"Server error: {str(e)}"}), 500
@app.route("/api/tools/malchela/mstrings", methods=["POST"])
def malchela_mstrings():
"""MalChela: Extract strings, apply Sigma rules, map to MITRE ATT&CK."""
try:
params = request.json
filepath = params.get("filepath", "")
if not filepath:
return jsonify({"error": "filepath parameter is required"}), 400
command = f"cd {MALCHELA_DIR} && ./target/release/mstrings \"{filepath}\""
result = execute_command(command)
return jsonify(result)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error in malchela_mstrings endpoint: {str(e)}")
return jsonify({"error": f"Server error: {str(e)}"}), 500
@app.route("/api/tools/malchela/malhash", methods=["POST"])
def malchela_malhash():
"""MalChela: Query a hash against VirusTotal and MalwareBazaar."""
try:
params = request.json
hash_value = params.get("hash", "")
if not hash_value:
return jsonify({"error": "hash parameter is required"}), 400
command = f"cd {MALCHELA_DIR} && ./target/release/malhash \"{hash_value}\""
result = execute_command(command)
return jsonify(result)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error in malchela_malhash endpoint: {str(e)}")
return jsonify({"error": f"Server error: {str(e)}"}), 500
@app.route("/api/tools/malchela/nsrlquery", methods=["POST"])
def malchela_nsrlquery():
"""MalChela: Query file hash against NIST NSRL known-good database."""
try:
params = request.json
filepath = params.get("filepath", "")
if not filepath:
return jsonify({"error": "filepath parameter is required"}), 400
command = f"cd {MALCHELA_DIR} && ./target/release/nsrlquery \"{filepath}\""
result = execute_command(command)
return jsonify(result)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error in malchela_nsrlquery endpoint: {str(e)}")
return jsonify({"error": f"Server error: {str(e)}"}), 500
@app.route("/api/tools/malchela/hashit", methods=["POST"])
def malchela_hashit():
"""MalChela: Generate MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 hashes for a file."""
try:
params = request.json
filepath = params.get("filepath", "")
if not filepath:
return jsonify({"error": "filepath parameter is required"}), 400
command = f"cd {MALCHELA_DIR} && ./target/release/hashit \"{filepath}\""
result = execute_command(command)
return jsonify(result)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error in malchela_hashit endpoint: {str(e)}")
return jsonify({"error": f"Server error: {str(e)}"}), 500
@app.route("/api/tools/malchela/fileminer", methods=["POST"])
def malchela_fileminer():
"""MalChela: Scan a directory for file type mismatches and metadata anomalies."""
try:
params = request.json
dirpath = params.get("dirpath", "")
if not dirpath:
return jsonify({"error": "dirpath parameter is required"}), 400
command = f"cd {MALCHELA_DIR} && ./target/release/fileminer \"{dirpath}\""
result = execute_command(command)
return jsonify(result)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error in malchela_fileminer endpoint: {str(e)}")
return jsonify({"error": f"Server error: {str(e)}"}), 500

Important note on malhash: Unlike the other tools which take a file path, malhash takes a hash string as its argument. The route reads a hash parameter and passes it directly to the binary. Passing a filepath to malhash will fail silently — a subtle but critical distinction.

mcp_server.py changes

The MalChela tool definitions need to be added to the setup_mcp_server() function, immediately before the return mcp line.

    @mcp.tool(name="malchela_fileanalyzer")
    def malchela_fileanalyzer(filepath: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """
        MalChela: Static file analysis - hashes, entropy, packing detection,
        PE metadata (imports, sections, timestamps), YARA matches, VirusTotal status.
        Best first step for any unknown file.

        Args:
            filepath: Absolute path to the file to analyze

        Returns:
            Analysis report
        """
        return kali_client.safe_post("api/tools/malchela/fileanalyzer", {"filepath": filepath})

    @mcp.tool(name="malchela_mstrings")
    def malchela_mstrings(filepath: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """
        MalChela: String extraction with IOC detection and MITRE ATT&CK mapping.
        Applies Sigma-style detection rules, flags suspicious patterns (registry keys,
        encoded payloads, suspicious DLL+API combos), maps findings to ATT&CK techniques.

        Args:
            filepath: Absolute path to the file to analyze

        Returns:
            String analysis with ATT&CK mappings and IOCs
        """
        return kali_client.safe_post("api/tools/malchela/mstrings", {"filepath": filepath})

    @mcp.tool(name="malchela_malhash")
    def malchela_malhash(hash: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """
        MalChela: Query a file hash against VirusTotal and MalwareBazaar.
        Returns detection ratio, AV verdicts, first/last seen dates, and sample metadata.
        Requires VT_API_KEY env var; MB_API_KEY optional.

        Args:
            hash: MD5, SHA1, or SHA256 hash string to query

        Returns:
            Threat intel results from VirusTotal and MalwareBazaar
        """
        return kali_client.safe_post("api/tools/malchela/malhash", {"hash": hash})

    @mcp.tool(name="malchela_hashit")
    def malchela_hashit(filepath: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """
        MalChela: Generate MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 hashes for a single file.
        Lightweight when you need hashes without full fileanalyzer output.

        Args:
            filepath: Absolute path to the file

        Returns:
            File hashes
        """
        return kali_client.safe_post("api/tools/malchela/hashit", {"filepath": filepath})

    @mcp.tool(name="malchela_fileminer")
    def malchela_fileminer(folderpath: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
        """
        MalChela: Scan a folder for file type mismatches and metadata anomalies.
        Classifies all files, flags executables disguised as other types.

        Args:
            folderpath: Absolute path to the folder to scan

        Returns:
            File classification and anomaly report
        """
        return kali_client.safe_post("api/tools/malchela/fileminer", {"dirpath": folderpath})

    return mcp

One parameter naming detail worth noting: mcp_server.py receives folderpath from Claude, but must pass it as dirpath in the JSON body to kali_server.py — that’s what the Flask route reads. The tool definition above handles this correctly.

After saving both files, restart the MCP server and restart Claude Desktop.

Testing on an unknown malware sample

[below is the exact response received from Claude]

I’ll run MalChela analysis on that file via Toby. Let me load the tools first.Tools loaded. Running fileanalyzer first for static analysis, then mstrings for IOC/ATT&CK mapping. Let me verify the path exists:File confirmed on Toby. The MalChela MCP tools use local paths — let me run it directly via the Kali execute_command since the MCP path routing doesn’t map Toby paths. I’ll invoke MalChela’s binaries directly:MalChela binaries found. Running the full suite now:That’s already very telling. Now running mstrings for IOC and ATT&CK mapping:Now let me pull the VirusTotal intel on the hash:That’s a solid picture. Here’s the full analysis breakdown:

🔴 MalChela Analysis — unknown.exe

Identification

FieldValue
SHA256dca40a0120ea176aa65b99c90d171761cb8bf696be4be026941f7f54e3c21635
MD55e364c1e35445b655ca30ab0c5bc7a4a
SHA10ac9950d00429ff4509c7fb9aa7320a45a0465ea
MalwareBazaar FilenameBL 3425005143.bat (disguised as .bat, submitted as .exe)
OriginPoland (PL), submitted anonymously
First Seen2026-03-03 13:38:42 UTC — very fresh

🧬 Verdict: GuLoader

39/69 detections on VirusTotal. Multiple vendors confirm this as GuLoader (NSIS-based downloader/injector):

  • ESET: NSIS/Injector.ENS trojan
  • Malwarebytes: Trojan.GuLoader
  • Fortinet: NSIS/Injector.7A4A!tr
  • Kaspersky: HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Minix.gen
  • MalwareBazaar Signature: GuLoader

📦 Static Analysis Highlights

  • Entropy: 7.96 — near-maximum, strongly indicating packed/encrypted payload
  • Packer: NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) wrapper — common GuLoader delivery vehicle
  • Compile Timestamp: 2018-12-15 (likely spoofed/stomped)
  • Unsigned — no digital signature
  • 5 PE sections including .ndata (atypical NSIS section, flagged as suspicious)
  • 159 imports, including the dangerous trio:
    • GetProcAddress / LoadLibraryExA — dynamic API resolution (evasion)
    • ShellExecuteExA — process execution

🎯 MITRE ATT&CK Mappings (from mstrings)

TechniqueIDTactic
Obfuscated Files or InformationT1027Defense Evasion
Process InjectionT1055Defense Evasion / Privilege Escalation
Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsT1071.001Command and Control

🌐 Network IOC

  • http://nsis.sf.net/NSIS_Error — NSIS error handler URL (confirms NSIS wrapper), not inherently malicious but characteristic of GuLoader’s packaging

Summary

This is a live GuLoader sample — an NSIS-wrapped shellcode injector/downloader commonly used as a first-stage payload to retrieve second-stage malware (often AgentTesla, Remcos RAT, FormBook, etc.). The high entropy, dynamic API loading, and process injection indicators are all consistent with GuLoader’s known behavior. Treat this as active malware — do not execute outside an isolated sandbox.


Approach 2: Persistent MalChela Instructions in OpenCode on REMnux

The REMnux OpenCode integration I described in the previous post worked, but it had one friction point: each new session required re-pasting the MalChela context. OpenCode has a solution for this — the AGENTS.md file.

Place an AGENTS.md file in your working directory (or MalChela’s root directory) and OpenCode will automatically load it as persistent context for every session started from that location. This is the most lightweight way to make MalChela tool-aware without building any infrastructure.

Create the file at /home/remnux/Tools/MalChela/AGENTS.md:

# MalChela Tool Instructions for AI Assistants
MalChela is installed at: /home/remnux/Tools/MalChela
All tools are Rust binaries. The execution pattern is:
cd /home/remnux/Tools/MalChela
./target/release/<toolname> <arguments>
## Primary Static Analysis Tools
| Tool | Binary | Description |
|------|--------|-------------|
| File Analyzer | fileanalyzer | Hash, entropy, packing detection, PE info, YARA scan, VirusTotal lookup |
| mStrings | mstrings | String extraction, Sigma rule matching, Regex, MITRE ATT&CK mapping |
| NSRL Hash Lookup | nsrlquery | Query MD5/SHA1 against the NIST NSRL known-good database |
| Malware Hash Lookup | malhash | Query a hash against VirusTotal and MalwareBazaar |
## Additional Tools
| Tool | Binary | Description |
|------|--------|-------------|
| File Miner | fileminer | Scan directories for file type mismatches and metadata anomalies |
| Hash It | hashit | Generate MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 for a single file |
| mzHash | mzhash | Recursively hash all files in a directory |
| Extract Samples | extract_samples | Extract files from password-protected malware archives |
## Recommended Workflow
For initial triage of an unknown file:
1. fileanalyzer - establish baseline: hashes, entropy, PE headers
2. mstrings - extract strings, look for IOCs and ATT&CK technique indicators
3. malhash - check community threat intelligence
4. nsrlquery - confirm or rule out known-good status
## Environment Notes
- API keys (VT_API_KEY, MB_API_KEY) should be set in the shell environment
- MalChela integrates with REMnux tools; use REMnux CLI tools in conjunction as needed
- Case management is available via the MalChela GUI if a graphical session is active

When you start an OpenCode session from the MalChela directory, this context is automatically loaded. No manual pasting, no re-briefing.

Once complete I asked it to save the results to the Desktop in markdown.

What was cool to me about this approach is that using the installed REMnux tools, you can take the analysis further after MalChela. In my testing I (OpenCode) analyzed a file with mStrings. We then followed up by running capa against the file. From there we could compare what each tool detected and missed in the sample. (screenshot truncated)


Approach 3: MalChela as a Native MCP Server (Mac)

The most powerful integration is running MalChela as its own dedicated MCP server — making its tools directly available to Claude Desktop alongside the Kali server. This is what we built out as mcp-malchela.

The server is a small Node.js project that wraps MalChela’s binaries with proper MCP tool definitions. The key files are index.js (the server logic) and package.json.

package.json:

{
"name": "mcp-malchela",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "MCP server exposing MalChela malware analysis tools",
"main": "index.js",
"dependencies": {
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.0.0"
}
}

index.js — the server defines each MalChela tool with its input schema, executes the binary when called, and streams back results. Note that malhash is handled differently from the other tools — it receives a hash string rather than a filepath, so the argument routing accounts for that explicitly:

import { Server } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js";
import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
import { CallToolRequestSchema, ListToolsRequestSchema } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";
import { execSync } from "child_process";
import path from "path";
const MALCHELA_DIR = process.env.MALCHELA_DIR || "/Users/dmetz/GitHub/MalChela";
const RELEASE_DIR = path.join(MALCHELA_DIR, "target", "release");
const server = new Server(
{ name: "mcp-malchela", version: "1.0.0" },
{ capabilities: { tools: {} } }
);
const tools = [
{
name: "malchela_fileanalyzer",
description: "Analyze a file: hashes, entropy, packing detection, PE headers, YARA scan, VirusTotal lookup",
inputSchema: {
type: "object",
properties: {
filepath: { type: "string", description: "Absolute path to the file to analyze" }
},
required: ["filepath"]
}
},
{
name: "malchela_mstrings",
description: "Extract strings from a file, apply Sigma rules and Regex patterns, map to MITRE ATT&CK",
inputSchema: {
type: "object",
properties: {
filepath: { type: "string", description: "Absolute path to the file to analyze" }
},
required: ["filepath"]
}
},
{
name: "malchela_malhash",
description: "Query a hash against VirusTotal and MalwareBazaar",
inputSchema: {
type: "object",
properties: {
hash: { type: "string", description: "MD5, SHA1, or SHA256 hash string to query" }
},
required: ["hash"]
}
},
{
name: "malchela_nsrlquery",
description: "Query a file hash against the NIST NSRL known-good database",
inputSchema: {
type: "object",
properties: {
filepath: { type: "string", description: "Absolute path to the file to query" }
},
required: ["filepath"]
}
}
];
server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => ({ tools }));
server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {
const { name, arguments: args } = request.params;
const env = { ...process.env };
const binaryMap = {
malchela_fileanalyzer: "fileanalyzer",
malchela_mstrings: "mstrings",
malchela_malhash: "malhash",
malchela_nsrlquery: "nsrlquery"
};
const binary = binaryMap[name];
if (!binary) throw new Error(`Unknown tool: ${name}`);
// malhash takes a hash string; all other tools take a filepath
const arg = name === "malchela_malhash" ? args.hash : args.filepath;
const cmd = `cd "${MALCHELA_DIR}" && ./target/release/${binary} "${arg}"`;
try {
const output = execSync(cmd, { env, encoding: "utf8", maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024 });
return { content: [{ type: "text", text: output }] };
} catch (error) {
return { content: [{ type: "text", text: error.stdout || error.message }] };
}
});
const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
await server.connect(transport);

Setup:

mkdir ~/mcp-malchela
cd ~/mcp-malchela
# create index.js and package.json as above
npm install

claude_desktop_config.json — with both servers configured:

{
"mcpServers": {
"mcp-kali-server": {
"command": "ssh",
"args": [
"-i",
"/Users/dwmetz/.ssh/id_ed25519",
"dwmetz@192.168.10.89",
"mcp-server"
],
"transport": "stdio"
},
"malchela": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/Users/dmetz/mcp-malchela/index.js"],
"env": {
"MALCHELA_DIR": "/Users/dmetz/Tools/MalChela"
}
}
}
}

Restart Claude Desktop and both MCP servers will be active and available in every session.


I'll load the MalChela tools and run analysis on that file on your Mac.
Searched available tools
Starting with fileanalyzer for the full static analysis pass.
Fileanalyzer
VirusTotal flags it as malicious. Let me pull the full VT/MalwareBazaar intel and then run strings analysis.
Malhash
Confirmed SalatStealer. Let me run strings analysis to surface IOCs and ATT&CK mappings.
Ran 5 commands, used malchela integration
That's a solid picture. Here's the full breakdown:

🔴 unknown3.exe — SalatStealer (Confirmed Malicious)

Identity

FieldValue
SHA256e0c90f401ae5d23a551f2d75a826cec7f187a6b7f0da2d24565c880e027ae9a3
MD5cfcd64360a0b0c3185f9a48b1dbe1bdc
FamilySalatStealer (Trojan.PWS.Salat)
VT Detections33/68 — confirmed malicious
First Seen2026-03-03 15:37 UTC (very fresh)
OriginNL (Netherlands), reported by abuse.ch
LanguageGo (Golang) — evident from stdlib and module paths
Architecturei386 (32-bit PE)
PackerUPX (MalwareBazaar notes this is the UPX-decompressed form; original packed SHA256: 30a50cc0f7...)
Code SigningAbsent
Compile TimestampEpoch zero (1970-01-01) — deliberately zeroed/spoofed

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage (11 Techniques)

TechniqueIDWhat was found
Obfuscated Files / PackingT1027DOS stub + packer artifact
OS Credential Dumping (LSASS)T1003.001String matches
WMI Execution/DiscoveryT1047ffwmic reference
Process InjectionT1055Injection-capable imports
Scripting InterpreterT1059JSON/script interpreter refs
Web Protocol C2T1071.001WebSocket + HTTP/2 libs, hardcoded domains
System Info DiscoveryT1082System enumeration strings
File & Dir DiscoveryT1083File path enumeration
Ingress Tool TransferT1105Download capability
Unsecured CredentialsT1552passwordusernameloginPBEpasswordSet

Notable IOCs from Strings

  • Clients\DiscordTokens.txt — Discord token harvesting
  • moz_cookies SQL query — Firefox cookie theft
  • yandexbrowser — Yandex Browser credential targeting
  • *main.loginPBE — Login/credential parsing function
  • WebSocket C2 comms — *websocket.netDialerFunc*websocket.netError
  • WMI usage — likely for system enumeration pre-exfil

Bottom Line

This is a Go-compiled password/credential stealer targeting browsers (Firefox cookies, Discord tokens, Yandex Browser), using WebSocket for C2, with WMI-based discovery. It was UPX-packed (this is the unpacked copy), has a zeroed compile timestamp to defeat timestamp-based triage, and was submitted to MalwareBazaar just hours ago — very fresh sample. Do not execute in any environment without proper isolation.

VT permalink for full AV breakdown: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e0c90f401ae5d23a551f2d75a826cec7f187a6b7f0da2d24565c880e027ae9a3/detection


Comparing the Three Approaches

Kali MCP (Toby)OpenCode AGENTS.mdMalChela MCP
PlatformKali (Raspberry Pi)REMnuxmacOS
PersistenceFull (MCP server definition)Full (file-based)Full (MCP server definition)
Setup complexityMedium (SSH + server install + file edits)Low (one markdown file)Medium (Node.js server)
AI integration depthStructured tool callsNatural language with contextStructured tool calls
Best forField analysis with TobyREMnux-primary workflowsMac-based analysis with MalChela

All three approaches solve the same core problem from the original post: making the AI reliably aware of your tools without re-briefing it every session. The right choice depends on your primary analysis environment — or, if you’re like me, you end up running all three.


All of the configuration files discussed here — including the MCP server setup and the are available in the MalChela repository on GitHub. Clone or pull the latest and you should be ready to go. As always, if you run into issues or have ideas for where to take the MCP integration next, open an issue or drop me a note.

Enhancing Malware Analysis with REMnux and AI

Those familiar with my work know that I’m a big fan of the REMnux Linux distribution for malware analysis. When I developed MalChela, I included a custom configuration that can be invoked that not only includes the MalChela tool suite but also integrates many of the CLI tools installed in REMnux, providing an easy-to-use GUI.

Recently, a new REMnux release was released on Ubuntu 24.04. This was a welcome upgrade because REMnux was previously locked to 20.04, which was becoming outdated. As soon as I noticed the release announcement, I downloaded the latest version and installed the MalChela suite. Everything ran smoothly, and the GUI interface even appeared slightly sharper without any changes on my part.

While reviewing the release notes for the new version, I discovered that REMnux now includes integration with Opencode AI. In REMnux, several models are preconfigured to recognize the tools included in the distribution and their capabilities and syntax. You can use natural language prompts, and the system will interpret the request, execute the appropriate tools against the file, and provide a summary of the results. As mentioned in the documentation:

The AI uses the REMnux MCP server to run the appropriate REMnux tools automatically. The MCP server offers guidance regarding the tools that the AI should consider, but it’s up to the AI agent to decide on the analysis workflow. And, of course, your interactions, requests, and observations can also direct the AI regarding the analysis steps.

Key capabilities available to AI assistants through the REMnux MCP server:

  • Analyze files based on detected type (PE, PDF, Office docs, scripts, ELF, etc.)
  • Get tool recommendations for a specific file without running them
  • Run specific REMnux tools directly, including piped commands
  • Extract indicators of compromise (IOCs) from text
  • Get usage help for any installed REMnux tool

I experimented with a few of the usual suspects in my corpus and provided pretty generic prompts like “analyze (file-xyz)” and “what are the IOCs?” The results were very positive – but I’ve only scratched the surface in testing.

Then I decided to see how adaptive this AI was and how easy it would be to make it aware of new tools and syntax. I provided the following:


MalChela tool suite is  installed in /home/remnux/Tools/MalChela
All are rust based tools so cd to the MalChela directory, and then ./target/release/fileanalyzer (path to executable) would be the syntax. 
The 4 tools below are the primary tools for static analysis.
  File Analyzer       |  Get the hash, entropy, packing, PE info, YARA and VT match status for a file  
  mStrings            |  Analyzes files with Sigma rules (YAML), extracts strings, matches ReGex. 
  NSRL Hash Lookup    |  Query an MD5 or SHA1 hash against NSRL
  Malware Hash Lookup |  Query a hash value against VirusTotal & Malware Bazaar 

Immediately it began running the tools in MalChela against the malware file I was previously analyzing and provided a summary of the different tool results.

I plan to do a lot more testing but so far things are looking very promising.

So what do you think? Are you using AI in your malware analysis workflows? What capabilities of AI do you think are most useful when it comes to malware analysis? Let me know in the comments.

Huntress CTF: Week 3 – Miscellaneous: Who Is Real?, Operation Eradication

Who Is Real?

This was a change of pace from what a lot of the CTF has been; lots of malware and deobfuscation. In this challenge we’re tasked with figuring out which faces are real and which have been AI generated.

Before starting the challenge, I familiarized myself with

https://whichfaceisreal.com/learn.html

It gave me good ideas of things to look for regarding teeth, glasses, earrings, other faces in photos, etc.

Eventually, I was able to get 5 right in a row.


Operation Eradication

Let’s take a look at the configuration file.

This looks like a config file for rclone.

Using this information, and the url provided from the challenge, we can update our rclone config file.

Now using rclone we can connect to the remote location and hopefully start deleting these ‘sensitive’ files. If only it were so easy.

I was able to get a directory listing, so I knew that my credentials were successfully connecting.

I was all over the command options at https://rclone.org. Every DELETE or SYNC operation I could think of was failing.

At my wit’s end I pinged a friend who suggested trying to overwrite the files with a 0 bit file. If successful the files would still be there, but the content gone – so essentially, they’d be safe again.

Using the file listing from the server, I wrote a PowerShell script that would touch, or create a 0 byte file, locally for each file names.

Next the script would run the rclone copy command to copy the local 0 byte files to the network location.

I run the PowerShell script and then return to the webpage and refresh…

DOH! There was a typo in one line of the script. I’ll re-run the file listing command again. All but one file have the 0 byte file size.

Run the copy command one more time to take care of our errant file and…

Success!


Use the tag #HuntressCTF on BakerStreetForensics.com to see all related posts and solutions for the 2023 Huntress CTF.